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Abstract Orbital debris from over 50 years of human
activity in space are threatening the operations of existing
and future satellites and the sustainability of high-value
satellite orbits. This technical memorandum calls for the
development of a cadastre that depicts the vulnerability of
critical satellite orbits to accumulating orbital debris. A
space infrastructure vulnerability cadastre could serve as a
governance tool for use by developers and operators of
critical space infrastructures to better communicate the
current and future vulnerability of high-value orbits to the
accumulation of orbital debris. These high-value orbits are
susceptible to ‘‘loss’’ for decades or centuries if generation
of orbital debris continues unabated. The concept of
environmental critical loads is applied to heavily used
orbits as a way to indicate acceptable debris density for
satellite operations, and when debris density / risk thresh-
olds approach unacceptable levels that reduce the proba-
bility of sustaining spacecraft operations in those orbits.
Keywords Orbital debris  Satellite orbits  Space
cadastre  Space infrastructure
1 The Orbital Debris Threat to Space Critical
Infrastructure
Countries around the world are increasingly dependent on
space assets to fulfill many civilian and military critical
infrastructure functions such as communications, earth
imaging, navigation, and early warning systems. Sustain-
ment of space assets is now paramount to the economies
and security of spacefaring nations. In the United States,
critical infrastructures are thought of as so important that
their loss would have a debilitating effect on the security or
economic welfare of the country (DHS 2013). Communi-
cations satellites and associated ground station assets are a
part of the communications critical infrastructure in the
United States (DHS 2010). Space is probably not recog-
nized as a sector-specific critical infrastructure in the
United States due to the crosscutting and global nature of
its applications. Europe has already taken steps to classify
space as a critical sector and actions are under way to
classify certain space assets as critical infrastructures
deserving of increased measures of protection (Schmieer
2015). The economic value of space assets cannot be
overstated. According to the Satellite Industry Association,
global industry revenues were USD 189.2 billion in 2013
(SIA 2014).
As we continue to place satellites into orbit these space
assets are becoming increasingly vulnerable to loss due to
the threat of anthropogenic and technogenic contaminants,
collectively referred to as orbital debris. With orbital
velocities and closing velocities exceeding 7 km/s, satel-
lites are increasingly at risk of experiencing hypervelocity
collisions with orbital debris (and other satellites). The
consequence is loss of function or, more typically, com-
plete destruction. As fragile, complex systems, spacecraft
are vulnerable to debris impacts, especially debris of 1 cm
and larger in diameter. The high cost of spacecraft also
dictates few on-orbit spares and their complex nature
means replacements take years to build and launch.
It is useful to think of the components of space critical
infrastructure as comprising the physical asset (satellite)
and the orbit in which the asset operates. As a first order
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approximation, orbits can be thought of as space highways
whose locations are characterized primarily by their alti-
tude above the Earth and the angle at which the orbit is
inclined to the equator. We posit that satellite orbits are as
important as the assets that occupy the orbits. While
satellites are routinely replaced at the end of their opera-
tional life, orbits cannot be routinely replaced. While space
is unfathomably vast, only a limited number of highly
useful and sought-after orbits exist. Orbits are more sus-
ceptible to debris accumulation with increasing altitudes
and/or with increasing inclinations. Accumulation of debris
in high-value orbits increases collision risks to assets
operating there and reduces the sustainability of this prized
‘‘real estate.’’ Therefore, the orbital environment should be
maintained as a finite resource that must be protected and
conserved accordingly. We submit that sustainability could
be enhanced by more effective ways of characterizing the
degree to which critical orbits are vulnerable to loss of
usefulness due to the accumulation of space debris.
2 Valuable Satellite Orbits
Critical space assets occupy three broad orbital ranges. The
low earth orbit (LEO) range includes an altitude band of
200–2000 km above the Earth, and has the advantage of
close proximity to Earth and relative ease of access. Earth
observation, surveillance, and human spaceflight occur in
this orbital range. The medium earth orbit (MEO) range
occupies altitudes from approximately 10,000–20,200 km.
One of the more valuable orbits in MEO is at 20,200 km,
called the semisynchronous orbit, where the satellite orbital
period is exactly 12 h. This allows so-called ‘‘invisible
utilities’’ like the signals from global positioning system
(GPS) satellites to have lengthy transit times across the sky
and remain in view of GPS receivers for extended periods.
A geosynchronous orbit (GEO) altitude is approximately
35,786 km at a low or zero degree inclination and is prime
real estate for the large communications satellites. Satel-
lites in a ‘‘GEO’’ slot have an orbital period of exactly
24 h. The satellite appears to remain stationary in the sky,
allowing Earth-based antennas to be permanently pointed
at the satellite (Wertz 2011). Satellites in highly elliptical
orbits (ELI) round out the remainder of the assets in
valuable orbits. Of the total satellites operational in 2012,
419 were in GEO, 471 in LEO, 69 in MEO, and 35 in ELI
orbits (SIA 2012). Of the 73 commercial satellite launches
in 2014, 24 went to GEO, 10 to MEO, and 38 to LEO (SIA
2015). Figure 1 illustrates the approximate altitude ranges
relative to the Earth along with the ‘‘graveyard’’ disposal
altitudes for MEO and GEO orbits. Because satellites in
MEO and GEO are not de-orbited at the end of their useful
life, just enough fuel is saved to typically boost the satellite
into a higher orbit that will not interfere with operational
satellites in MEO and GEO for decades to come. Figure 2
illustrates the basic orbital parameters. Other important
parameters including the argument of perigee and true
anomaly are not necessary for now to describe our concept
of a vulnerability cadastre.
Satellites and their missions are optimized for a specific
orbit. They typically remain in that orbit throughout their
operational life, carrying just enough fuel to make orbit
altitude corrections for collision avoidance maneuvers.
Parameters such as mass, launch vehicle capability, cost,
sensor field-of-view, antenna coverage or receiver gain /
transmitter power are determined by the mission and orbit.
Most LEO and MEO satellites are placed in circular or
nearly circular orbits at inclinations specific to the mission.
For example, surveillance satellites are placed in circular
orbits with inclinations at or near 90 degrees to gain full
coverage of the Earth’s surface, and are known as polar
orbits. A satellite with a mission to observe mainly the
equatorial region would be placed into a lower inclined
orbit. GEO satellites are in circular orbits with an incli-
nation of zero degrees, that is, directly above the equator to
maintain a stationary position relative to a location on the
Earth’s surface. Protection of LEO, MEO, and GEO orbits
are important to sustaining space critical infrastructure.
3 Sources of Orbital Debris and Susceptibility
of Orbits to Debris Accumulation
All space activities are associated with debris-generating
events. A brief list of the more common debris or debris
sources include:
Fig. 1 Low earth orbit (LEO), medium earth orbit (MEO), and
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) altitudes. Source The authors
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• Spent launch vehicle stages / rocket bodies that are left
in orbit;
• Launch vehicle stages that explode in orbit either
before or after delivering their payloads;
• Satellite collisions with other satellites or with orbital
debris;
• Nonoperational satellites (due to technical failure or
end of mission life) that are not removed from orbit or
placed in a graveyard orbit;
• Fragmentation of satellites due to technical failure (for
example, propellant tank rupture, battery failure, or
attack by a kinetic energy weapon);
• Spent solid rocket propellant particles;
• Paint particles.
An example of recent debris generation occurred in
February 2015, when a debris field consisting of 43
trackable objects was observed near the US Air Force’s
DMSP-F13 weather satellite, leading some to conclude
onboard batteries exploded (Berger 2015). Orbital debris
accumulation by objects and mass is shown in Fig. 3.
However, the two most well-known recent debris gen-
erating events occurred in 2009 and 2007. In 2009, the
operational US Iridium 33 satellite collided with the non-
operational Russian Cosmos 2251 satellite at 790 km alti-
tude and a closing velocity of greater than 11 km/sec,
generating more than 2000 trackable debris objects. In
2007, the Chinese destroyed their nonoperational Fengyun-
1C weather satellite during an antisatellite (ASAT) weapon
test. While ASAT tests have been carried out by other
nations as well, destruction of the Fengyun-1C propelled
fragments from the nearly circular orbit of 845 9 865 km
to orbits with a perigee and apogee range from 200 to
4000 km (NASA ODPO 2007). This event currently tops
the list as the worst fragmentation event recorded as
measured by the United States Space Surveillance Network
(NASA APPEL 2012). These 2007 and 2009 events are
reflected in stepwise debris increases in Fig. 3.
Dispersion of the debris is illustrated in Fig. 4. A
satellite in an orbital plane possesses angular momentum,
like a gyroscope, with the orbital plane’s momentum vector
coincident with the gyro axis. Like a gyroscope, the orbital
plane is subject to precession, in this case, due to gravita-
tional torques from nonuniform mass distributions within
the Earth. The amount of precession per day, DX, is the
angular change in the right ascension of the ascending node
(RAAN), and is proportional to the cosine of the inclination
angle and altitude of the orbit (Wertz 2011). Thus, between
the precession and additional energy imparted to the par-
ticles due to explosion or collision, orbital debris can dis-
perse widely throughout an orbit at lower inclinations, but
will disperse less in polar orbits (inclination near 90),
contributing to debris density in polar orbits.
One quantification of orbital debris is the measure of
debris spatial density (number of particles in a unit vol-
ume), and another is debris flux, a measure of particles per
unit area over some period of time, for example, a year.
The spatial density of debris across the three orbital
regimes is plotted in Fig. 5, indicating where the most used
and therefore susceptible orbits lie. Clear peaks in debris
density are seen in LEO, MEO, and GEO. The lower plot in
Fig. 5 illustrates the increase of debris in LEO, growing by
over 100 % below 1,000 km in just seven years. The
Iridium/Cosmos collision and Fenyugn-1C destruction
accounts for most of the increase (NASA ODPO 2014b).
The operational community is debating the new concept of
small satellites, in particular, ‘‘cubesats.’’ These low-cost,
small satellites are generally launched as secondary pay-
loads and jettisoned into orbits that can enable them to
remain aloft for many years, well beyond the internation-
ally recognized period of deorbiting the satellite within
25 years of retirement. In one recent case, a cubesat was
placed in an 800 km orbit, potentially orbiting for
700 years due to lack of deorbit propulsion or deployable
drag devices (de Selding 2015). Orbits are susceptible to
debris for two primary reasons: they are highly utilized and
crowded; and the atmospheric/aerodynamic drag forces
that cause debris to eventually fall out of orbit in a fiery
return to Earth are vanishingly small above LEO.
While the debris generation sources described are suf-
ficient to degrade valuable orbits, there is also a growing
threat of intentional debris generation by enemy combat-
ants or rogue nations whose intention would be to deny
their enemies critical space infrastructure. Even rogue
nations with rudimentary ASAT capabilities are a threat.
This was explored in a gaming exercise by Gheorghe and
Vamanu (2007), who showed that publically available
Fig. 2 Basic orbit parameters. Source The authors
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software and satellite orbital information could be used to
calculate the proper intercept course to result in an ASAT-
based satellite kill. They concluded that space should be
viewed as a readily-vulnerable critical infrastructure.
Debris or derelict satellites can occupy valuable orbits
for a few months in the case of lower LEO debris, to
thousands if not millions of years for objects in GEO.
Debris lifetimes increase dramatically in the upper LEO
regime of approximately 600–1000 km, and lifetimes of
debris in orbit above 2000 km can for practical purposes be
considered indefinite (GlobalSecurity 2011).
Debris in higher LEO orbits can decay through, and
interfere with, spacecraft operating in lower orbits. Atmo-
spheric drag is the only significant contribution to the
removal of energy of orbiting objects below 600 km. The
amount of drag experienced by an object is related to the
object’s area to mass ratio (ballistic coefficient) and the
effects of solar cycle heating on the Earth’s thermosphere.
Any object above 1000 km will be essentially free of any
atmospheric drag and in orbit indefinitely. Satellites in
GEO, for example, could be regarded as new and perma-
nent astronomical bodies, orbiting for thousands of future
Fig. 3 Accumulation of orbital
debris, 1956–2014. Source
NASA ODPO (2014a, p. 10),
Top reprinted with permission;
NASA ODPO (2015a, p. 9),
bottom reprinted with
permission
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Fig. 4 Debris dispersion as of July 2012 of the 2007 Fengyun-1C destruction and the 2009 Cosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 collision. Source NASA
ODPO (2012, p. 2). Reprinted with permission
Fig. 5 Top debris spatial
density increase in low earth
orbit (LEO) from 2007 through
2014. Bottom orbital debris in
geosynchronous orbit (GEO) in
2012. Source NASA ODPO
(2014b, p. 10). Top Reprinted
with permission; NASA APPEL
(2012, p. 14), bottom Reprinted
with permission
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generations. It is interesting to consider that scientists 100
generations from now could still be tracking orbital debris
and spacecraft from our first 50 years of spaceflight. Most
events that generate orbital debris are unintentional and can
be limited with sufficient effort like end-of-life passivation,
boosting to disposal orbits, or deorbiting. However, debris
cleanup is at best difficult, and at worst impossible.
4 Consequences of Orbital Debris
Spacecraft are vulnerable systems with an inherently high
degree of susceptibility to hypervelocity debris impact.
Both elaborate modeling of the debris environment or
direct optical and radar observation are used to quantify the
collision risk to spacecraft. A hypervelocity collision with
debris much larger than about 1 cm in diameter essentially
ends the mission with the potential to generate a new debris
cloud that could persist for decades or longer. While
spacecraft carry protective shielding against micromete-
oroids and particles smaller than 1 cm in diameter, impacts
from paint flecks caused craters in the windows of the
Space Shuttle orbiter (NASA APPEL 2012). Onboard
redundancy provides a small degree of resiliency, and can
reduce susceptibility to single point failures such as loss of
a transmitter or receiver due to a small orbital debris
impact.
Operators of many high-value satellites and crewed
vehicles choose to perform conjunction analyses (collision
assessments) between their spacecraft and trackable debris,
and if necessary, execute collision avoidance maneuvers.
In the United States, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) policy requires routine conjunc-
tion analyses for all NASA assets with the capability to
maneuver (NASA OSMA 2009; NASA ODPO 2009).
Collision avoidance maneuvers performed by the Interna-
tional Space Station (ISS) are summarized in Fig. 6. With
no inherent propulsion, the ISS must rely on visiting
Russian or European vehicles to boost its altitude to avoid
debris. Given the debris density in Fig. 5, the probability of
a collision between orbital debris and a 10 m2 object
indicate the risk increases from 1 in a million at 200 km
altitude to a peak probability of greater than 1 in 10,000 at
altitudes just below 800 km. The probability decreases
slightly to 1 in 100,000 at approximately 1300 km and
jumps again to about 1 in 50,000 in the 1400–1500 km
range before slowly decreasing with altitude. As an
example, the probability of collision with the 10 m2 object
at 400 km (ISS altitudes) is roughly 1 in 100,000. This
probability increases for the ISS due to its larger area
(Ailor et al. 2010).
Not all operational spacecraft have the ability to
maneuver away from orbital debris and are thus at greater
risk. Moreover, maneuvering fuel is precious and operators
cannot afford to maneuver satellites unnecessarily or for
low-probability, high-consequence conjunctions.
By mission rules, the ISS would execute a collision
avoidance maneuver if the probability of debris penetrating
a ±0.75 km 9 ±25 km 9 ±25 km box centered on the
spacecraft was greater than 10-4.
Heavily used orbits, defined by altitude and inclination,
are becoming congested with both spent launch vehicle
stages, that is rocket bodies (R/B), and operational and
nonoperational spacecraft (S/C) (Fig. 7). A concept called
the Kessler Syndrome was introduced in the 1970 s to
describe the situation in an orbit, where random collisions
between debris would eventually produce a spatial debris
density greater than the natural meteoroid environment.
This ‘‘cascading collisions’’ concept was borrowed from
the theory of planetary ring formation, and suggests debris
collisions could increase spatial debris density to a point
that would prevent satellite operations in those orbits
(Kessler and Cour-Palais 1978; Kessler 1991). Evidence
suggests this may be occurring in heavily used orbits.
Continuing to add spacecraft and upper stages to these
orbits, especially at altitudes above 600 km and high
inclinations will worsen the problem, eventually making
the risk of operating in theses orbits intolerably high by
shortening spacecraft lifetimes (Kessler et al. 2010).
International governance policies exist to reduce debris
generation through multiple technical and operational
means (IADC 2007). Incomplete compliance with the
measures are increasing the chances that orbits become
more ‘‘polluted’’ with debris, and increase the probability
of destructive hypervelocity impacts. A spacecraft opera-
tor’s action to not maintain the fuel reserve needed to boost
a satellite to a disposal orbit or deorbit, either through
Fig. 6 Number of collision avoidance maneuvers performed by the
International Space Station, 1998–2014. Source NASA ODPO
(2015b, p. 1). Reprinted with permission
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neglect or profit motives, or to not reenter a spent upper
stage rocket in order to devote that fuel to lofting heavier
payloads, could ultimately end in a consequential explosion
or collision that generates harmful debris with detrimental
effects on all nation’s assets and the shared orbits. The
more spacefaring nations become dependent on space
critical infrastructures, the more interested they should
become in the conservation of ‘‘orbital infrastructure.’’
Orbital debris has no national boundaries.
5 Communicating the Vulnerability of Space
Critical Infrastructure
A new approach is presented as a way to increase the
awareness that accumulating orbital debris can infringe on
the sustainment of current and future space critical infras-
tructure. The concepts of a space critical infrastructure
vulnerability index and cadastre is introduced and con-
ceptually developed to provide a vulnerability and conse-
quence-based visualization of the orbital debris threat. This
representation could serve as a compelling communica-
tions tool in debris mitigation and reduction governance
efforts.
5.1 The Concept of a Vulnerability Index Map
and Risk Cadastre
A cadastre is traditionally a record, survey, or map of the
value, extent, and ownership of land. Detailed boundaries
and property lines can be shown along with topographical
information. Thanks to Geographic Information Systems
(GIS), cadastral maps are commonplace. When overlaid
with data that represent various forms of environmental
risk and vulnerability from nuclear, chemical, or biological
accidents, these maps acquire a prominent added value.
Our approach is best understood by analogy. A vulnera-
bility cadastre geographically indicates areas that have
some probability of experiencing harm with high-expected
consequences for either the occupying population (satel-
lites in this case) or the environment (high-value orbits).
The simplest form of a risk and vulnerability cadastre is of
an expected casualty or fatality effect area due to an
accidental release of toxic liquids, gases, or explosions,
overlaid on a map. Density levels of the toxic substance in
the unique environment are developed from models (both
simple and sophisticated) in order to derive the risk con-
tours. This type of cadastre is featured in the rapid risk
assessment methodology recommended by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 1996). More com-
plex cadasters include buildings and terrain features to
develop more accurate dispersion maps of airborne toxins
and biological agents. Concentrations of an environmental
contaminate can be indicated with limits that range from
tolerable to intolerable, leading to increased morbidity or
death. We next introduce a method of quantifying the
vulnerability of an orbit to debris accumulation.
5.2 Coupling Critical Loads with a Cadastre
The concept of critical loads is employed in pollution
studies to convey the vulnerability of geographical areas to
environmental contamination that exceeds a certain
threshold. That threshold is referred to as the ‘‘critical
load.’’ According to the US National Atmospheric Depo-
sition Program—NADP (2013, p. 2), a critical load is
defined as ‘‘…the quantitative estimate of an exposure to
one or more pollutants below which significant harmful
Fig. 7 Large mass objects in
high inclination orbits. Note:
R/B denotes rocket bodies, S/C
denotes spacecraft. Source
NASA ODPO (2011, p. 6).
Reprinted with permission
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effects on specified sensitive elements of the environment
are not expected to occur according to present knowledge.’’
Based on these definitions, a notional graph of the rela-
tionship between cumulative contaminate load and resul-
tant effect is illustrated in Fig. 8. Critical loads are based
on a dose–response relationship, where the accumulation or
deposition of contaminant doses eventually exceed the
harmful threshold, which is the critical load of contami-
nants in the ecosystem is exceeded and damage occurs
(Enviropedia 2013). Atmospheric transport is the primary
dose deposition mechanism. The concept of critical loads
was introduced in 1988 by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) on Long Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution as a tool for the development of
abatement strategies and agreements on reduction of
regional air pollutants (Hultberg et al. 1994). If a con-
taminant remains under the critical load value, the effect on
the sensitive ecosystem receptor or target is minimal, and
the ecosystem is not degraded further. However, environ-
mental effects become noticeable once the critical load is
reached as shown in Fig. 8. In Fig. 9, the critical load
concept has been combined with a terrain cadastre,
resulting in a sophisticated risk and vulnerability cadastre.
Knowing the present, target, and critical loads, the cadastre
can be calibrated to visually convey the risk or vulnera-
bility of geographical areas to an environmental contami-
nant. We suggest a compelling visual risk and vulnerability
cadastre could be developed for orbital debris (WHO
2000).
5.3 Development of a Space Critical Infrastructure
Vulnerability Cadastre
The concept of critical loads may have a natural extension
to the effect of orbital debris on space critical infrastruc-
ture. As the debris spatial density in an orbit increases, the
target load with safety factor threshold would eventually be
exceeded (Fig. 8). Satellite operators may begin to notice
effects beyond this threshold with the risk of operational
problems increasing. Beyond the critical load threshold in
that orbit, the debilitating effects on space assets would
become more pronounced. Increasingly frequent debris
impacts would degrade operations or shorten mission life,
catastrophic collisions could end missions, and an
increased number of expensive collision avoidance
maneuvers would need to be executed by operational
spacecraft. Such maneuvers shorten mission life by
depleting fuel reserves. Only the lowest orbits in LEO,
below approximately 600 km, have a degree of resiliency
and sustainability due to the cleansing effect of atmo-
spheric drag and solar cycles. Resiliency of an orbit could
potentially be defined as the availability of atmospheric and
gravitational forces to cause debris to reenter the atmo-
sphere in a reasonable amount of time (a few days to a few
years). Unfortunately, the concept of resiliency is essen-
tially nonexistent in higher orbits, making the accumula-
tion of debris in these orbits problematic and reducing their
sustainability.
A developmental approach is proposed in Fig. 10. The
general concept used in environmental science is to
establish target and critical levels of contaminants, that is
sources that could be tolerated at target receptors or loca-
tions before the pollution or operational risk becomes
unacceptable. On the ‘‘Pollutant’’ side of Fig. 10 we seek
to measure and develop representations of the present
orbital debris environment; and on the ‘‘Receptor at Risk’’
side we seek to establish the target load and critical load
values (for example, debris spatial density for the high-
value orbits). The concept for target and critical loads
would be established by an international body such as the
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC), using the risk governance concept of As Low as
Reasonably Acceptable (ALARA). Requirements devel-
opment would be a trade between the needed spatial/tem-
poral resolution in an orbit and existing measurement
capabilities.
Establishing target and critical loads would be a chal-
lenge, but there are approaches to set the minimum (target
load) and maximum (critical load). For example, in each
high-value orbit, the target debris load would indicate the
maximum amount of debris acceptable to spacecraft
operators and insurers based on shielding, impact risk,
numbers of collision avoidance maneuvers likely for an
average size satellite operating in that orbit, and longevity
of the debris. As an intermediate step to the realization of a
vulnerability cadastre, the vulnerability of a single orbit to
loss or reduced utilization could be represented by a vul-
nerability index map in order to work through the details of
this concept.
A theoretical orbit vulnerability index is presented in
Fig. 11. A modified Torino color-coded scale for near-
Fig. 8 The concept of target, critical, and present environmental
loads. Source The authors
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Earth objects could be used, for example, to convey the
consequence of increasing levels of debris density in each
orbital vulnerability index map. Target loads are also
useful in that they can provide a measure of how much
carrying capacity in total debris the orbit can hold before
reaching the next highest threshold. The left side of the
vulnerability index map in Fig. 11 shows three thresholds
of debris loads that the orbit could ‘‘carry.’’ Target loads
would probably need to be set increasingly lower above
600 km due to the increasing lifetime of debris at higher
altitudes. Target loads would need to be even lower for
MEO and GEO due to the multicentury or multimillennia
lifetimes of debris in those orbits. One benefit of being in
the geostationary arc is that the relative velocity between
spacecraft is very low compared to the hypervelocity rates
in LEO. Thus, chances of hypervelocity collisions in GEO
are much lower when compared to LEO. Establishing
target and critical loads would also be useful in determin-
ing the types and degrees of mitigation and remediation
necessary to sustain high-value orbits. International policy
and guidelines could be updated to support maintaining
orbits below target or critical load thresholds.
Fig. 9 Example of a risk
cadastre of contaminate






Fig. 10 Approach to developing a high-value orbit vulnerability index map and risk cadastre. Source The authors
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The values of target and critical loads for a specific
ecosystem are based on careful study and analysis. For
critical orbits, defining target and critical loads will be
influenced by factors specific to the space domain. While
critical loads may be set by the capabilities of current
orbital debris shielding technologies (for example, Whipple
Shields) or by the satellite operators’ and insurance com-
panies’ risk tolerance, target loads may be more chal-
lenging to define. Once the target load threshold has been
reached for a critical orbit, policy may dictate no new
operations unless debris remediation measures are included
in the launch vehicle and satellite to minimize the proba-
bility of generating additional debris and exceeding the
critical load threshold. Debris remediation measures drive
up system costs through increased design complexity and
mission complexity, and may be a cost burden for
emerging spacefaring nations. But it is a small price to pay
to maintain the sustainability of critical orbits. An agreed-
upon strategy or policy is necessary to set target loads and
how the orbit is used after the target load is exceeded.
5.4 Potential Usage
Operators would want the high-value orbits maintained in
the green vulnerability areas in Fig. 11, where sustain-
ability is certain and risk to their assets are low. In the
yellow ALARA region, operational risk increases. Any
operator wishing to place satellites into an orbit measured
as having a ‘‘yellow’’ vulnerability index could be required
to guarantee that they would execute debris mitigation
procedures. This could mean 100 % compliance with
postmission disposal recommendations for both their
satellite and upper stage launch vehicle per IADC (2007),
or pay a fine. The money could be used as a ‘‘toxic waste
site superfund’’ to support implementation of active debris
removal concepts. Perhaps even more compelling than
fines would be to deny licensing of the frequency spectrum
to repeat offenders. The satellite is useless if not allowed to
transmit.
The yellow ALARA region is where the spacecraft
insurers could take an active role, ensuring that reliable,
100 % postmission disposal systems are designed into the
spacecraft they insure. Getting the insurers involved is
perhaps the greatest lever in the commercial sector. The
orange portion of the ALARA region is where the debris
environment is eroding the safety margin built into this
band, signaling the orbit is well on its way to becoming
unusable for some duration into the future and that sus-
tainability will be lost. Once in the red zone, launches to
that orbit would need to stop until the environment was
remediated by either drag effects in LEO or by active
debris removal. The LEO region below 600 km is vulner-
able to large amounts of debris due to its usage, but is the
most resilient region due to the cleansing effect of atmo-
spheric drag. Vulnerability index maps for LEO would
have to be updated frequently, especially since debris from
higher LEO orbits pass through lower orbits on their way to
eventual reentry into the atmosphere.
Fig. 11 Theoretical vulnerability index map with thresholds for a specific orbit (altitude and inclination). Source The authors
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5.5 Conclusion and the Path Ahead
An integrated approach to developing cadastral represen-
tations of orbital debris risks is needed. One such concept is
illustrated in Fig. 12, which leverages qualitative vulnera-
bility assessment (QVA) tools and decision support sys-
tems (DSS) (Gheorghe and Vamanu 2004). Numerous
tangible and intangible variables would be used to deter-
mine target and critical loads and ultimately the vulnera-
bility of orbits and their visual representations. While no
one representation may meet the requirement of conveying
the level of operational risk inherent in an orbit, such tools
would help rapidly explore the vulnerability index map and
cadastre representations.
Ultimately, the goal is to develop a clear and compelling
method of communicating operational risks to the current
and future users of critical orbits as well as the insurers.
Useful visualization of orbit vulnerability cadasters will be
difficult due to the fact that debris can disperse from an
initial altitude/inclination, for example, due to a continuous
change in RAAN (see Fig. 2) in nonpolar orbits. Both the
vulnerability index map and visualization of a risk cadastre
would need to be calculated frequently for each specific
orbit of interest. For debris measurement, existing model-
ing approaches would be of great use. For example, orbital
debris models like ORDEM 3.0 could be used to propagate
‘‘witness plates’’ in specific, high-value orbits that are
standard sizes or represent specific spacecraft to determine
the spatial density or flux of debris (Stansbery and Matney
2014). But setting target and critical loads, enforcement of
mitigation, and navigating the politics may be more diffi-
cult than engineering a cadastral representation.
An ideal ‘‘home’’ for the proposed vulnerability index
map and cadastre would be either the satellite insurers,
IADC, or in the Space Security Index ‘‘Theme 1: Condition
and knowledge of the space environment’’ and ‘‘Theme 4:
Outer space governance’’ (SSI 2014). United Nations outer
space organizations could benefit as well. The US
Department of Homeland Security could also adopt such a
communications tool for use in governance of the Com-
munications Critical Infrastructure. The bottom line is to
persuade space policy makers to enforce orbital debris
mitigation policies and develop monetary or sanction-like
policies for noncompliance to finally ‘‘bend the space
debris curve’’ back in the direction needed to sustain our
critical space infrastructure.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creative
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link
to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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